Economics focus Banks need more capital

Alan Greenspan says banks will need much thicker capital cushions than they had before the bust

Greenspan AssociatesAlan Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 1987 to 2006. He is now president of Greenspan Associates

GLOBAL financial intermediation is broken. That intricate and interdependent system directing the world’s saving into productive capital investment was severely weakened in August 2007. The disclosure that highly leveraged financial institutions were holding toxic securitised American subprime mortgages shocked market participants. For a year, banks struggled to respond to investor demands for larger capital cushions. But the effort fell short and in the wake of the Lehman Brothers default on September 15th 2008, the system cracked. Banks, fearful of their own solvency, all but stopped lending. Issuance of corporate bonds, commercial paper and a wide variety of other financial products largely ceased. Credit-financed economic activity was brought to a virtual standstill. The world faced a major financial crisis.

For decades, holders of the liabilities of banks in the United States had felt secure with the protection of a modest equity-capital cushion, allowing banks to lend freely. As recently as the summer of 2006, with average book capital at 10%, a federal agency noted that “more than 99% of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.”

Today, fearful investors clearly require a far larger capital cushion to lend, unsecured, to any financial intermediary. When bank book capital finally adjusts to current market imperatives, it may well reach its highest levels in 75 years, at least temporarily (see chart). It is not a stretch to infer that these heightened levels will be the basis of a new regulatory system.

The three-month LIBOR/Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spread, a measure of market perceptions of potential bank insolvency and thus of extra capital needs, rose from a long-standing ten basis points in the summer of 2007 to 90 points by that autumn. Though elevated, the LIBOR/OIS spread appeared range-bound for about a year up to mid-September 2008. The Lehman default, however, drove LIBOR/OIS up markedly. It reached a riveting 364 basis points on October 10th.

The passage by Congress of the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) on October 3rd eased, but did not erase, the post-Lehman surge in LIBOR/OIS. The spread apparently stalled in mid-November and remains worryingly high.

How much extra capital, both private and sovereign, will investors require of banks and other intermediaries to conclude that they are not at significant risk in holding financial institutions’ deposits or debt, a precondition to solving the crisis?

The insertion, last month, of $250 billion of equity into American banks through TARP (a two-percentage-point addition to capital-asset ratios) halved the post-Lehman surge of the LIBOR/OIS spread. Assuming modest further write-offs, simple linear extrapolation would suggest that another $250 billion would bring the spread back to near its pre-crisis norm. This arithmetic would imply that investors now require 14% capital rather than the 10% of mid-2006. Such linear calculations, of course, can only be very rough approximations. But recent data do suggest that, while helpful, the Treasury’s $250 billion goes only partway towards the levels required to support renewed lending.

Government credit has in effect acted as counterparty to a large segment of the financial intermediary system. But for reasons that go beyond the scope of this note, I strongly believe that the use of government credit must be temporary. What, then, will be the source of the new private capital that allows sovereign lending to be withdrawn? Eventually, the most credible source is a partial restoration of the $30 trillion of global stockmarket value wiped out this year, which would enable banks to raise the needed equity. Markets are being suppressed by a degree of fear not experienced since the early 20th century (1907 and 1932 come to mind). Human nature being what it is, we can count on a market reversal, hopefully, within six months to a year.

Though capital gains cannot finance physical investment, they can replenish balance-sheets. This can best be seen in the context of the consolidated balance-sheet of the world economy. All debt and derivative claims are offset in global accounting consolidation, but capital is not. This leaves the market value of the world’s real physical and intellectual assets reflected as capital. Obviously, higher global stock prices will enlarge the pool of equity that can facilitate the recapitalisation of financial institutions. Lower stock prices can impede the process. A higher level of equity, of course, makes it easier to issue debt.

Another critical price for the return of global financial stability is that of American homes. Those prices are likely to stabilise next year and with them the levels of home equity—the ultimate collateral for global holdings of American mortgage-backed securities, some toxic. Home-price stabilisation will help clarify the market value of financial institutions’ assets and therefore more closely equate the size of their book capital with the realities of market pricing. That should help stabilise their stock prices. The eventual partial recovery of global equities, as fear inevitably dissipates, should do the rest. Temporary public capital injections into banks would facilitate this process and arguably provide far more benefit per dollar than conventional fiscal stimulus.

Even before the market linkages among banks, other financial institutions and non-financial businesses are fully re-established, we will need to start unwinding the massive sovereign credit and guarantees put in place during the crisis, now estimated at $7 trillion. The economics of such a course are fairly clear. The politics of draining off that much credit support in a timely way is quite another matter.

Corporate lending: Waiving or Drowning

Dec 4th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Even big firms are finding it tough to secure credit from the banks

Illustration by David Simonds

CONVENTIONAL wisdom says that it is better to be a large company than a small one when credit is tight. Bigger firms have more room for manoeuvre: they have access to more types of funding, they have more fat to cut, and they have greater bargaining power with lenders. Even so, life is getting ever more uncomfortable for the bigger beasts of the corporate jungle.

According to the Federal Reserve’s most recent lending survey, American banks are tightening terms more aggressively for bigger firms than for tiddlier ones (see chart). Lenders are more cautious than they have been at least since 1990. The story among European banks is similar. Lenders in emerging markets can be more suspicious of multinational firms than they are of locals. “We just don’t know what they’ve got on their balance-sheets back home,” says one bank boss in Africa.

Violent movements in exchange rates are causing additional headaches, says Andrew Balfour of Slaughter & May, a law firm. Calculations of financial ratios can be thrown out by wild currency movements, potentially triggering breaches of loan covenants. Companies with sterling-denominated credit lines may find that their facilities are not big enough as a result of the pound’s recent sharp fall, for instance.

It is not panic stations yet. Most firms can survive for a while with the credit tap turned off. Analysis by Moody’s, a rating agency, shows that the vast majority of highly rated companies in America and Europe have enough headroom, in the form of cash and undrawn bank facilities, to be able to survive for 12 months without needing new financing. European corporate-debt markets have seen a rare flurry of issues in the past few days by opportunistic, highly rated firms.

Governments are also working hard to prop up credit markets. The Fed’s programme to buy commercial paper, a form of short-term company debt, had acquired almost $300 billion by November 26th. Banks on both sides of the Atlantic are issuing lots of government-backed bonds, which should encourage lending.

For now, an uneasy truce exists between most companies and their lenders. Some banks made tentative attempts in the autumn to pull out of loan agreements because their cost of financing had spiked so high. But they quickly backed down. In turn, banks are doing what they can to persuade corporate treasurers not to draw down credit facilities unless they have to. But hard choices are looming.

As the economic news worsens and profits dive, more firms will be at risk of breaching covenants on standard measures such as the ratio of debt to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. Furthermore, a good deal of debt will fall due in the next few years: Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation, a data provider, estimates that more than $1 trillion of loans will need to be refinanced globally in each of the next three years, mainly in America and Europe.

Competition for capital is bound to increase in that time, given the coming torrent of government-debt issuance. Auditors also want to be reassured about refinancing prospects well before maturity dates so they can sign off on companies as going concerns. With little obvious benefit in waiting, many expect to see a concerted effort by companies to renegotiate funding facilities early in 2009, once the year-end squeeze is over (see article).

In the face of more requests for waivers and refinancings, banks will react selectively. “We will distinguish between companies that are temporarily in crisis and those that are not,” says Alessandro Profumo, the chief executive of UniCredit, an Italian bank.

The lucky ones will still pay a hefty price for access to credit. Not only will the costs of borrowing zoom, but terms will become much tighter. Old-fashioned provisions such as “clean-up” clauses, which require borrowers to pay their debts down to zero for a specified period every year, are creeping back into some discussions. The onus is also on borrowers to show that they are taking steps to cut costs before they come to lenders for more money. Banks want to know that you have exhausted all other avenues yourself, says Sheila Smith of Deloitte, a consultancy. Even then, facilities are likely to shrink as non-bank investors such as hedge funds drop out of loan syndicates and banks that had only extended money in the hope of ancillary business also draw back.

For those firms that find doors starting to shut on them, the prospects are grim. Despite some talk of a bigger role for private placements, this is not the best time to start forging relationships with new creditors if existing ones turn unfriendly. Many firms are going into this downturn with fewer unencumbered assets than in previous recessions, which makes it harder to secure new credit. Asset disposals, one obvious way of raising cash, are extremely hard to pull off at the moment. Nor does it help that many corporate loans have been securitised and divvied up among lots of investors, making it harder for firms to negotiate modifications.

Projections for defaults are rising fast. Bain, a consultancy, now expects as many as 140 American speculative-grade companies to default in 2010, sharply up from a forecast of 40-50 in April. Worse, firms that default are likelier to end up in full liquidation. In America, debtor-in-possession financing, which helps firms that have entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to meet their cash needs while they reorganise, has dried up. “The gap between financial distress and financial disaster has become much smaller,” says John Grout of the Association of Corporate Treasurers, a British trade body. So too, it seems, has the difference between big companies and small ones

WB forecasts Gloom in Global Economy

Emerging economies will grow more slowly in 2009 The World Bank has forecast a significant decline in global economic growth in 2009 for both developed and emerging countries. In a report assessing economic prospects, the Bank has predicted that the world's annual economic growth will slow to 0.9%, from 2.5% this year. The rate of growth for emerging economies is expected to be around 4.5%, down from 7.9% in 2007. The Bank said a deep global recession could not be ruled out. And its forecast suggests that, on a per capita basis, world growth would be negative in 2009. "Following the insolvency of a large number of banks and financial institutions... capital flows to developing countries have dried up and huge amounts of market capitalisation have evaporated," the bank said. The World Bank has warned that some emerging economies are likely to face serious challenges, including bank failures and currency crises, even if global bail-out plans start restoring confidence in financial markets. The Bank's chief economist, Justin Lin, said the financial crisis "has eased tensions in commodity markets, but is testing banking systems and threatening job losses around the world". It also warns that capital flows to developing countries are shrinking fast, reducing the level of investment, while the slowdown in world trade is likely to cut into their export markets. Regional impacts Even the fast-growing emerging giants, India and China, are likely to suffer from the slowdown. The World Bank projects China's growth to slow from 11.9% in 2007 to 7.5% in 2009, while India's growth prospects will be cut from 9% to 5.8%. The impact of falling commodity prices has been positive for around half of developing countries. In response to the global downturn, the World Bank is increasing its support for developing countries by helping local banks recapitalise and providing aid for infrastructure projects. Despite the current crisis, the Bank says that the long-term growth prospects for developing countries remain strong, and this will lead to substantial reduction in world poverty rates by 2015, with just 15% of people living on less than $1.25 per day, compared to 25% in 2005. However, it warns that severe poverty in sub-Saharan Africa will fall less quickly, with 37% still living on $1.25 per day by 2015.

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Trade, exchange rates, budget balances and interest rates

Trade, exchange rates, budget balances and interest rates as of August 28

Trade, exchange rates, budget balances and interest rates

Aug 28th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Why China is not to blame for the surge in global inflation

Inflated claims

Aug 14th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Why China is not to blame for the surge in global inflation

MANY people in America and Europe think that the recent surge in inflation, like almost everything else these days, is “made in China”. For a number of years, cheap Chinese goods helped to reduce prices in rich economies, but more recently wages and prices have surged in China. On top of this, the hungry dragon’s insatiable appetite for food, energy and other raw materials has given cartoonists an emotive image for the surge in global commodity prices. As a result, it is claimed, China is no longer exporting deflation to the rich world, but inflation.

China’s inflation rate did indeed hit almost 9% earlier this year (by July it had fallen to 6.3%). And after declining for several years, the prices of America’s imports from China jumped by 5.3% in the year to July, pushing up the prices of goods in Wal-Mart, where many Americans shop. However, import prices from China are rising more slowly than the cost of goods from elsewhere: the average price of manufactured goods imported into America from industrialised countries rose by 10.1% over the past year (see left-hand chart). Moreover, all of the increase in the price of Chinese imports reflects the fall in the dollar against the yuan, not higher costs in China. In yuan terms, average Chinese export prices are still falling.

There is something to the claim that China’s huge demand for food and energy is pushing up global commodity prices. China has accounted for a big slice of the growth in global consumption of oil and especially metals this decade, helping to drive prices higher. But its effect on global prices over the past year (when rich-world inflation took off) is easily overstated. The pace of growth in China’s oil demand slowed to 4% last year. That is still relatively high, but not nearly as much as its annual rate of 12% in 2001-04, a period when the Fed was fretting about deflation, not inflation. And China’s food production has grown faster than consumption over the past few years. As a small, but growing, net exporter of wheat, maize and rice, China has, if anything, helped to ease world grain prices.

A more nuanced argument, suggested in a recent speech by Donald Kohn, the Federal Reserve’s vice-chairman, is that lax monetary policies have recently caused emerging economies such as China to grow too fast, putting extra demand on resources. Mr Kohn concluded that central banks in emerging economies should tighten policy to restrain economic growth and so reduce global inflation. There are merits to this argument, but there is also a danger that Mr Kohn may be trying to pass the buck. After all, America’s interest rates have been historically low for most of the past decade and thus it must share much of the responsibility for higher global inflation.

Mr Kohn used to argue that globalisation had a muted impact on American inflation. In 2006 he said that emerging economies were mildly disinflationary, because by running current-account surpluses they were adding more to global supply than to demand. China still has a large external surplus, so—using the same logic—how can it now be fuelling world inflation? Other inconsistencies abound. Some economists accuse China of overheating and exporting inflation, at the same time as they criticise it for overinvesting and creating excess capacity, which would imply downward pressure on prices. Last year it was fashionable to argue that China should boost its domestic demand to reduce its excess saving; now it is being told to tighten monetary policy, which would slow the growth in demand.

Cheap at twice the price

Some of this confusion reflects a widespread misunderstanding about how China’s integration into the world economy affects prices in the rich world. A common mistake is to assume that falling export prices mean that China is exporting disinflation, whereas rising export prices imply it is exporting inflation. The truth is that the level of Chinese prices matters much more than their rate of increase. China helped to hold down inflation in developed economies not because its prices were falling, but because its goods were much cheaper.

In theory, global trade should cause prices in different countries to converge: the prices of low-cost producers should gradually increase as wages rise (ie, China’s falling prices were a temporary anomaly), while the prices of high-cost producers should fall. Thus so long as China’s wages and the prices of its goods remain well below those in rich countries (see right-hand chart, above), its increasing penetration of world markets will continue to depress prices for many years. For example, according to BCA Research, a firm of economic analysts, the prices of Chinese exports of electric motors and generators doubled over the past five years, yet because they remain much cheaper than American-produced products, their share of the American market has more than doubled, forcing local producers to cut prices. As China moves up the value chain, it will export cheaper products in new industries, such as cars. This will help to hold down global prices—although possibly by less than in the past.

Perhaps the best way to determine China’s impact on world inflation is to gauge whether its net impact is to increase aggregate global demand or supply. China is boosting both, but so far its “positive supply shock” has been the more important. The integration of China and other emerging economies into the world trading system has, in effect, more than doubled the global labour force, and by curbing workers’ bargaining power it has restrained pay demands in most developed economies in recent years. Despite higher consumer prices in America and the euro area, wage growth has remained subdued and real wages have fallen, which has prevented inflation from becoming entrenched.

Imagine if China did not trade with the rest of the world. Oil prices would be cheaper, whereas clothes, DVD players and computers would be dearer. China’s biggest global impact is on relative prices. The net result, however, is still disinflationary. China is a handy scapegoat, but the real blame for the rise in inflation in the rich world may lie with monetary policy closer to home.

taken from:http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920640

The world is poorer than we thought, the World Bank discovers

The world is poorer than we thought, the World Bank discovers

IN APRIL 2007 the World Bank announced that 986m people worldwide suffered from extreme poverty—the first time its count had dropped below 1 billion. On August 26th it had grim news to report. According to two of its leading researchers, Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, the “developing world is poorer than we thought”. The number of poor was almost 1.4 billion in 2005.

This does not mean the plight of the poor had worsened—only that the plight is now better understood. The bank has improved its estimates of the cost of living around the world, thanks to a vast effort to compare the price of hundreds of products, from packaged rice to folding umbrellas, in 146 countries. In many poor countries the cost of living was steeper than previously thought, which meant more people fell short of the poverty line.

Ms Chen and Mr Ravallion have counted the world’s poor anew, using these freshly collected prices. They have also drawn a new poverty line. The bank used to count people who lived on less than “a dollar a day” (or $1.08 in 1993 prices, to be precise). This popular definition of poverty was first unveiled in the bank’s 1990 World Development Report and was later adopted by the United Nations (UN) when it resolved to cut poverty in half by 2015.

The researchers now prefer a yardstick more typical of the 15 poorest countries that have credible poverty lines. By this definition, people are poor if they cannot match the standard of living of someone living on $1.25 a day in America in 2005. Such people would be recognised as poor even in Nepal, Tajikistan and hard-pressed African countries such as Uganda. But for those who still think a “dollar a day” has a better ring to it, the authors also calculate the number of people living on less than that at 2005 prices (see table).

The discovery of another 400m poor people will not satisfy some of the bank’s critics, who think it still undercounts poverty. Its cost-of-living estimates are based on the prices faced by a “representative household”, whose consumption mirrors national spending. But the poor are not representative. In particular, they buy in smaller quantities—a cupful of rice, not a 10-kilogram bag; a single cigarette, not a packet. As a result, the “poor pay more”.

Such concerns prompted the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to carry out its own study of the prices faced by the poor in 16 of its member countries (not including China). Its results, released on August 27th, found that in nine of those countries the poor in fact pay less. Even though they buy in smaller quantities, they save money by buying cut-price goods from cheaper outlets: kerbside haircuts not salons; open-air stalls not supermarkets; toddy not wine.

This penny-pinching adds up. In Indonesia, for example, the poor’s cost of living is 21% below the World Bank’s estimate. The survey also shaved more than 10% off the cost of living in other populous countries, such as Bangladesh and India. The difference was narrower in smaller countries, such as Cambodia. This may be because in big countries, such as India, the rich are large in number, though a tiny part of the population. Perhaps their spending has an undue influence on the prices faced by the representative household.

The ADB’s findings face an obvious philosophical objection. In theory a poverty count is supposed to calculate how many people fail to meet a certain standard of living. A person eating coarse rice, not fine-grained basmati, dressed in polyester not cotton, has a lower standard of living, even if he eats the same amount of grain and owns the same number of shirts. And when a household buys fruit in a supermarket, its members are buying more than just an apple. They are also enjoying the comfort of air-conditioning, the convenience of a parking space, and the hygiene of airtight packaging. But until such comforts are within the poor’s reach, the ADB is right to track the prices the poor actually pay. It hopes the next global price survey, due in 2011 and led by the World Bank, will do the same. Then, perhaps, the number of poor will be back to nine digits.

taken from :http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12010733

Danger ahead for the mighty euro

Apr 10th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Euro-zone economies face external woes and internal tensions

Illustration by Peter Schrank

AT THE World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2001, the mood was sombre. The dotcom bubble had burst spectacularly, the Nasdaq stockmarket had crashed, and the American economy was tipping into recession. Yet most continental Europeans were breezily optimistic. The long years of being lectured about their inadequacies by the Anglo-Saxons were over. Europe had wisely skipped the dotcom mania, and its new currency, the euro, was giving the continent a boost. Some Europeans even dreamed of taking over as the motor of the world economy. But it was not to be, as Europe promptly fell into a deeper recession even than America.

Seven years on, the parallels are uncanny. Continental Europe has sensibly avoided America's subprime follies, it is argued. Its banks are in better shape, average euro-area unemployment of 7.1% is the lowest in almost 20 years, the euro is resurgent and, as Joaquín Almunia, the engaging European economics commissioner, insists, there is no sign of a recession. The commission will trim its forecasts later this month, but euro-area growth is likely to stay close to 2% this year. It is true that the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt has, like America's Federal Reserve, flooded the financial system with liquidity in response to the credit crunch. But unlike the Fed, it has not so far felt the need to bring down interest rates.

Just as in 2001, however, the outlook for the euro area seems to be deteriorating a lot faster than the optimists had expected. After all, the main reason that the ECB has been reluctant to cut rates is not because growth is so robust but because inflation has picked up to 3.5%—the highest in the euro's nine-year existence. Troubles in the region's two biggest export markets—recession in America and slowdown in Britain—are starting to bite. Exports to Asia have been strong, especially from Germany, but in most countries nervous consumers remain reluctant to spend.

And two bigger worries have emerged. The first is the strength of the euro. A weaker dollar is driving an American export boom; a stronger euro is likely to have the opposite effect in Europe. Mr Almunia says the euro is “overvalued” and adds that, although the impact has been moderate so far, “we are at the limits, if not beyond them.” It is a delusion to suppose that euro-area exports can continue to barrel on regardless of their cost.

The second worry is the housing market. Europe may have avoided the American subprime mess, but in several countries house prices have been even bubblier than in America. They are already falling in Spain and Ireland, and, beyond the euro zone, are starting to do so in Britain. A property bust may not produce an American-style mortgage meltdown, but it will surely topple economies heavily dependent on construction (which accounts for 15% or more of Spanish and Irish GDP, for example).

Indeed, Mr Almunia's home country of Spain appears especially vulnerable. He maintains that Anglo-Saxon commentators are excessively pessimistic about Spain's prospects. But the signs of a sharp slowdown are clear even to the re-elected prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who has announced a fiscal stimulus to help Spain weather the “turbulence”. Given that Spain has in recent years accounted for a big chunk of euro-zone growth and close to half of all jobs created in the euro area, its slowdown will be widely felt. And not just in economics. It will be a lot harder to sell the EU's ambitious plans to cut CO2 emissions in a faltering economy, for instance.

The political fallout will be felt in other ways too, because of the differential performance of euro-area economies. Mr Almunia admits that France and Italy are a lot weaker than Germany; soon enough, French and Italian leaders (especially if Silvio Berlusconi wins Italy's imminent election) will squeal ever more loudly about the euro's strength, the ECB's rigid monetary policy and, quite possibly, will demand that their industries be protected from “unfair” competition. Such pressure will be resisted by the Germans, who remain comfortable with the euro's strength and always hate criticism of the ECB.

The dark face of success

Even critics of the euro would concede that it has had considerable success, establishing itself in less than a decade as a genuine rival to the dollar as a world currency. But that success disguises two failings. The first is that some countries have adapted a lot better to the discipline of the euro than others. Germany and the Netherlands have cut labour costs and introduced enough reforms to make their economies more competitive. France, Spain and especially Italy have done less—and are suffering more, from both the euro's rise and the global slowdown.

The second failing is an ironic flipside of success. To qualify for the euro in the late 1990s, countries such as Italy and Spain had to make swingeing fiscal and structural adjustments. Yet by shielding weaker countries from a currency crisis, the euro now relieves much of the pressure on them to keep up reforms. In fact, these are more essential than ever now that countries have lost the option of devaluing their currencies to regain competitiveness and offset relatively slow productivity growth. As Mr Almunia sadly concedes, it has proved impossible “to compensate for the lack of market incentives for reform through policy co-ordination and peer pressure”.

In truth, as the euro approaches its tenth birthday celebrations, it is facing the biggest test of its short life. If Europe follows America into recession, which is quite possible, the pain will be a lot greater in the Mediterranean countries than in Germany and northern Europe. Not surprisingly, the political response from the two regions will also be quite different. Even as it prepares to expand once more to take in Slovakia and later other countries from eastern Europe, the euro is about to show the world that it is not yet an optimal currency area—and the demonstration may not be a pretty one.

Currency Exchange rate to the US Dollar

Asia & Pacific	to the US$
Australian Dollar	0.92
Bahrain Dinar	2.65
Hong Kong Dollar	0.13
Indian Rupee	0.02
Indonesian Rupiah	0
Japanese Yen	0.01
Kuwaiti Dinar	3.75
Malaysian Ringgit	0.31
New Taiwan Dollar	0.03
New Zealand Dollar	0.8
Pakistani Rupee	0.02
Papua N. Guinea Kina	0.36
Philippines Peso	0.02
Qatari Riyal	0.28
Singapore Dollar	0.72
South Korean Won	0
Thai Baht	0.03
United Arab Emirates Dirham	0.27

Europe	to the US$
British Pound	2
Cypriot Pound	2.69
Czech Republic Koruna	0.06
Danish Krone	0.21
European Euro	1.58
Hungarian Forint	0.01
Maltese Lira	3.67
Norwegian Krone	0.2
Swedish Krona	0.17
Swiss Franc	1.01

Africa	to the US$
Algerian Dinar	0.02
Cameroon Franc	0
Egyptian Pound	0.18
Malawi Kwacha	0.01
Mauritius Rupee	0.04
South African Rand	0.12
Tanzania Shilling	0
Tunisian Dollar	0.87
Americas	to the US$
Argentine Peso	0.32
Brazilian Real	0.58
Canadian Dollar	1
Chilean Peso	0
Jamaican Dollar	0.01
Mexican New Peso	0.09
Peruvian Sole	0.36

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